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Open source software (OSS) development methodology that promises to produce reliable, 
flexible, and high quality software code, at minimal cost, by harnessing the power of distributed 
peer review and transparency of process and has become increasingly popular in the past few 
years. For-profit companies have increasingly adopted the OSS paradigm to produce quality 
software at low cost. A vast majority of OSS projects depend on voluntary contributions by 
developers to sustain their development. In this context, turnover of developers has been 
considered a critical issue hindering the success of projects. This dissertation develops two 
studies addressing the issue. The first study is a methodological pilot and lays the foundation of 
this research by focusing on modeling turnover behavior of core open source contributors using a 
logistic hierarchical linear modeling approach. It argues that argue that taking both the developer 
and the project level factors into account will lead to a richer understanding of the issue of 
turnover in open source projects. The second study provides a conceptual integration of 
developer and project level factors using the Ownership, Role theory and Social Identity 
literatures, and proposes testable hypotheses, methods and findings. The implications of this 
research are likely to benefit OSS managers in understanding the developer and project level 
factors associated with developer turnover and the contexts in which they interact.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Open Source is a software development methodology that promises to produce reliable, flexible, 
and high quality software code, at minimal cost, by harnessing the power of distributed peer 
review and transparency of process, thereby preventing predatory vendor lock-in
1
. In addition to 
the access to source code, Open Source Software (OSS) must meet the criteria of, among others, 
free redistribution, ability to modify the source code and create modified works
2.
 The OSS 
phenomenon has been of great interest to the field of Information Systems since it has emerged 
as a viable and successful alternative to the conventional forms of software production that have 
traditionally been the focus of the field.    
The existing research in OSS can be broadly organized in three streams. The first stream 
of research has focused on the motivations of OSS participants to contribute, especially since 
participants may not receive any financial compensation for their efforts. This research has 
established that participants are motivated due to a variety of reasons including the need for 
software, enjoyment, learning, altruism, ideological commitment, peer recognition and reputation 
building (e.g. Feller et al. 2005; Lakhani and Wolf 2003; Shah 2006).  A second stream of 
research has studied the coordination mechanisms, decision making and management practices 
                                                 
1
 http://opensource.org/  
2
 http://opensource.org/docs/OSD 
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prevalent in OSS (e.g. O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007; Mockus et al. 2003; Crowston et. al. 2005). 
Finally, the third stream of existing research has focused on the quality and success of the end-
product (i.e. software) and the socio-technical factors affecting it (e.g. Crowston et al. 2006; 
Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010; Setia et. al. 2010; Grewal, et al. 2006, Singh 2010, Singh, et al. 
2011; Daniel et. al. 2012).              
Open Source Software communities are often cited as prime examples of modern, online, 
community based forms of production that have been recognized by organizational theorists as 
alternatives to the traditional market and hierarchical forms of organization and production 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). Such communities depend on voluntary contributions to create 
software either for public or private benefit (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), shun bureaucracy 
and authoritarian forms of governance (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979), and encourage democratic 
participation of members involved in production (Rothschild and Russell, 1986). A critical issue 
in this context therefore, is how to organize the production of software by directing individuals’ 
efforts toward a common goal without any contractual or hierarchical reinforcement (O’Mahony 
and Ferraro, 2007). Furthermore, it is not trivial to align individual motives and goals with a 
common objective (March and Simon, 1958), and hence achieve efficiency in software 
production. Such democratic forms of organization face difficulty in decision making and 
coordinating and most importantly, in sustaining member activities. Thus, it is essential to create 
and nurture a consensual basis of authority to facilitate the management and direction of 
development and sustain developer interest and commitment (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007). 
This issue assumes an even critical importance in the light of the fact that most OSS projects fail 
to develop due to a lack of a critical mass of developers needed for sustained development 
(Chengalur-Smith et. al., 2010).  
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Indeed, developer turnover in Open source software (OSS) projects is a non-trivial issue 
because of the frequency with which it occurs and its negative impact on project performance. 
Turnover is specified as voluntary job termination (Sheridan 1985) or more simply as an 
employee leaving a current job (Fields et al. 2005). Robles and Gonzales-Barahona (2006) 
analyzed the evolution of some OSS projects (e.g., GIMP, Mozilla) over 7 years and found that 
these projects suffered from yearly turnover in core development teams and had to rely heavily 
on regeneration. Similar results on turnover were reported by von Krogh et al. (2003) in their 
analysis of the Freenet project.   
Turnover has been recognized as a critical issue in organization research due to its 
adverse effects on firms’ productivity levels (e.g. Ton and Huckman 2008; Shaw 2011). 
Turnover is also a critical problem in software development projects because it can lead to 
schedule overruns (Collofello et al. 1998) and regenerating teams is a complicated issue (Reel 
1999). Regeneration is challenging in OSS development because of the “contribution barrier” 
where newcomers face difficulty in acclimatizing themselves with the complex architecture of 
the project (Crowston et al. 2004; von Krogh et al. 2003). Once participants overcome this 
contribution barrier, it is in the best interest of the project to retain them. Therefore, there is 
intense competition for participants among OSS projects (Ahokas and Laurila 2004; 
Krishnamurthy 2005).  
Past research has studied how OSS communities evolve organization structures for better 
effort management and coordination (O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Mockus et al. 2002; von 
Krogh et al., 2003). This body of research has consistently pointed to the gradual introduction of 
ownership (access to rights) to developers based on meritocracy and expertise. Developers 
generally start contributing as peripheral members and are accorded progressively higher set of 
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rights, duties and ownership of code modules based on their demonstration of commitment and 
expertise
3
. Google Code for example, allows developers to be owners (co-owners), committers 
and contributors
4
. Thus, owners may be “sole owners” or “part owners” depending upon the 
ownership structure within the project. The owners enjoy the highest levels of rights and have the 
ability to control the project structure, code and workforce. Committers’ rights are restricted to 
making changes to the code, but not controlling the overall structure of the code or the 
workforce. Contributors on the other hand, may only comment and point out issues; however 
their rights may be upgraded and they may be allowed to make code commits. Such an 
organization allows the module owners to oversee the efficient development of code and grant 
rights and duties to developers to make changes to the code. 
However, the impact of the organization structure of OSS communities on member 
retention is an often a neglected area of work in OSS research. The implicit assumption in the 
existing OSS studies is that ownership provides prestige to the owners and makes them more 
committed, but what has not been studied is under what conditions do we expect to see such 
positive effects of developer ownership levels on their attitudes such as turnover. Expecting a 
simple positive main effect of ownership level on retention, however, may be too simplistic due 
to the complex nature of the ownership construct and the novelty of the OSS context, as we 
outline below.   
                                                 
3
 Different projects may follow different strategies to accord ownership rights. Apache project for example, 
follows an emergent ownership structure where some participants emerged as “de facto” owners of modules through 
their continued code development and commitment to a module. Mozilla on the other hand, follows an “enforced” 
ownership strategy where every change to the code is reviewed by the module owner (Mockus et al. 2002).              
4
 http://code.google.com/p/support/wiki/Permissions  
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Sociology, Psychology and Organizational Behavior literature have studied the issue of 
formal and psychological ownership as an organizational arrangement and employee 
participation. Since the 1970s, there has been continued interest in employee ownership, 
anchored in the hope that it would promote favorable worker attitudes, strengthen industrial 
democracy and enhance firm performance (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). On the one hand, 
researchers following the macro-tradition in this area have tended to focus on the positive effects 
of employee ownership on firm level outcomes such as productivity. On the other hand, 
researchers following the micro-tradition have treated the individual as the level of analysis and 
have sought to observe a simple main effect of level of ownership (equity or share stakes) and 
their level of performance (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). These models suggest that this 
ownership-performance relationship is an outgrowth of, among other things, economic incentives 
(Conte and Svejnar, 1990) and favorable employee-owner attitudes (Long, 1980). However, in 
contrast to positive effect models, there are models that have reported negative effects mainly 
due to increased monitoring costs and the free-rider effect (Blasi et al. 1996; Conte and Svejnar, 
1990).  
In addition, the ownership literature does not offer concrete evidence and the process 
involved that can help differentiate among the effect of sole ownership and co-ownership on 
employee performance. On the one hand, it may be argued that the effect of sole ownership on 
developer retention rates may be greater than the effect of co-ownership because sole ownership 
allows for a greater degree of control, authority, and sense of responsibility. Along similar lines, 
Wagner and Rosen (1985) argued that as the actual amount of ownership increases, the 
incentives associated with making the project may also increase. On the other hand, Long (1978) 
argued that when ownership leads to an integration of an employee in the organization, 
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performance (and hence retention rates) should increase as a result of peer pressure, motivation 
and cooperative behaviors. This suggests that the effect of co-ownership on retention rates occur 
possibly due to different mechanisms (e.g. peer pressure) than sole ownership. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether we may expect greater effects of sole ownership on retention rates as compared 
to co-ownership (or vice-versa) and under which conditions. Overall, Pierce and Rodgers (2004) 
note that the effects of ownership on employee attitudes are mixed and depend to a great extent 
on contextual effects.  
In the OSS context, a critical component of the traditional perspective on ownership-
performance relationship (economic incentive) is attenuated or missing, since most developers 
work voluntarily on projects without any financial compensation. Additionally, the traditional 
ownership models have assumed that an employee works for a given company. However, in the 
OSS context developers are not restricted to maintain their association to only a single project at 
any given time. Hence developers may simultaneously be involved in multiple projects and may 
have different ownership levels in each. Therefore, assuming homogeneity among developers 
based on their ownership levels in the project may provide an inaccurate picture. In addition, 
each project may have different characteristics that may impact developers’ willingness to 
maintain the association with the project. For example, projects may differ on the ratio of 
number of owners and the number of developers. Given these issues, we argue that OSS research 
needs to study the effect of ownership levels on developer turnover under the varying contextual 
surroundings of developer level and project level characteristics.  
The existing research on OSS developer motivation has tended to focus on the 
explanation of developer activity levels using either the individual perspective (Hars et al. 2003; 
Hertel et al., 2003) or the project perspective (Stewart and Gosain 2006; Stewart et al. 2006). 
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Empirically, however, since OSS participants are embedded in (often multiple) projects it is 
important to relate the characteristics of individuals and the characteristics of projects in which 
they function. Previous studies have neglected this important distinction (however, see Setia et. 
al., 2010 for an exception).  
Disaggregating all project level variables in an individual level analysis may lead to the 
violation of the assumption of independence of observations, since all developers will have the 
same value on each of the project variables. On the other hand, aggregating developer level 
variables to a project level analysis may lead to unused within group information (Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002). Including project level variables in a developer level model is likely to create 
aggregation bias, which can underestimate the effects of variables that are estimated at the 
inappropriate level. While including aggregated values of developer level variables in a project 
level model may fail to fully capture the effects of certain variables (Rumberger 1995). None of 
the research studies have attempted to model turnover behavior in OSS in a comprehensive 
fashion taking into account both the developer level and project level factors.  
In addition, OSS developers do not work in vacuum; rather they work in a very dynamic 
environment and may fluidly move across multiple projects, contribute and play different roles in 
them simultaneously. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that both the ownership levels and the 
project level characteristics may determine developers’ interactions with projects.                
Past research has convincingly established the adverse impacts of developer turnover on 
the performance of software projects (Hall et al. 2008, Abdel-Hamid, 1992). However, we are 
interested in exploring the inverse relationship, i.e. whether the performance of a software 
project itself may contribute to developer turnover. If this is so, then this may create a feedback 
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mechanism through which the prospect of sustaining the project may quickly spiral down. In 
Psychology literature, Social Identity Theory (SIT) posits that people tend to classify themselves 
and others into various social categories such as group membership, religious affiliation etc 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1985). Such a social classification allows an individual to define him or 
herself in the social environment. Thus, social identification is the perception of oneness or 
belongingness to some human aggregate and results in the individual perceiving the fate of a 
group as their own. SIT maintains that the need for a positive identity among individuals 
produces strong reactions when that identity is threatened, such as in the case of group failure. 
When the social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will either strive to leave their existing 
group and join some more positively distinct group or make their group more positively distinct 
by contributing (Tajfel and Turner, 1985). Thus, SIT proposes a theoretical mechanism to test 
the effect of project (group) performance on the mean turnover rate. Therefore, using the 
Ownership literature and the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1985), we hope to 
address the following broad research questions:  
 How does a developer’s ownership level influence turnover from a given open 
source project, given that a developer may appear in multiple projects at once? 
 What other developer level factors moderate the relationship between developer’s 
ownership level and turnover from a given project, given that a developer may appear in multiple 
projects at once?  
 Does project level success or failure moderate the relationship between 
developer’s ownership level and turnover from a given project, given that a developer may 
appear in multiple projects at once?  
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The dissertation is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a methodological 
pilot study that focuses on modeling turnover behavior of core open source contributors using a 
logistic hierarchical linear modeling approach. Here, we argue that taking both the developer and 
the project level factors into account will lead to a richer understanding of the issue of turnover 
in open source projects. This study allowed us to explore whether there exist significant variation 
in turnover among OSS projects and whether this variation may be explained using developer 
and project level characteristics. We note the implications and deficiencies in this pilot study and 
propose that further enhancements leading to a conceptual integration of developer and project 
level factors in modeling turnover would lead to a richer understanding rather than just an 
empirical integration.  
In the second (main) study we explore such a conceptual integration using the Ownership 
and Social Identity Theory literatures, propose testable hypotheses, and describe the empirical 
methodology and results. This study also compares some alternative ways to measure turnover. 
Finally, we conclude with the weaknesses, and overall research and practical implications of this 
thesis.        
  
 xix 
 
2.0 STUDY 1: EXAMINING TURNOVER IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PROJECTS 
USING LOGISTIC HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING APPROACH
5
 
This pilot study develops a model of turnover behavior in OSS. The analysis focuses on two 
levels: the developer level, which examines factors that may affect developers’ decisions to 
become inactive, and the project level, which examines the factors that may influence the rates of 
turnover among projects. Specifically, we hope to address the following research questions:  
 Do the open source projects vary in their mean turnover rates (intercepts)?  
 What developer level factors influence turnover from open source projects? 
 What project level factors influence the mean turnover rates among projects? 
Answering these questions allows us to motivate our larger goal of studying turnover in 
OSS. In what follows, we present a brief theoretical background of the developer and project 
level factors that may affect mean turnover rates among projects. This is followed by the 
methodology section where we outline the empirical methods used in the study and present the 
preliminary results. Finally we conclude by noting the limitations of this work and suggesting the 
steps we intend to take in the future to further improve this study.    
                                                 
5 
This pilot study has appeared as the following book chapter: Sharma, P.N., Hulland, J. and Daniel, S. 
"Examining Turnover in Open Source Software Projects Using Logistic Hierarchical Linear Modeling Approach," 
in I. Hammouda et. al. (Eds): Open Source Systems: Long Term Sustainability, IFIP Advances in Information and 
Communication Technology (OSS 2012), v. 378, pp. 331-337, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.  
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2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Research on participation in OSS projects has mainly focused on two different levels of analysis. 
The first, focusing on individual level addresses the general question: What factors motivate 
developers to contribute to projects? A second strand of research focuses on the project level 
factors. The focus of this research has been: What project level characteristics explain activity 
levels in projects? Past studies have tended to focus on one level or the other, but in order to 
understand why there is such widespread turnover in OSS projects, it is necessary to consider 
both perspectives (Rumberger 1995). In what follows, we describe the developer level and 
project level factors that may influence turnover behavior in OSS projects.        
2.1.1 Developer Level Factors 
Central to our discussion of the developer perspective is the notion of contribution barrier (von 
Krogh et al. 2003). If the developer does not have the required knowledge and skills to contribute 
to the project then the effort level required by him/her increases. In their study of Freenet, von 
Krogh et al. (2003) found that among other skills the knowledge of the programming language 
also erected barriers for beginning participants. They confronted the need to learn the language 
before they could contribute, thereby increasing the effort required. The knowledge of software 
architecture and the development processes also raise this barrier (Crowston et al. 2004). If the 
cost of effort required to contribute to the project is excessively high as perceived by the 
participant, s/he may not be motivated to continue contributing to the project. As per Crowston 
and Fagnot (2008), the higher the domain knowledge of the developer, the lesser is the effort 
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needed to contribute and higher the motivation. If an employee (or an OSS participant) does not 
have the requisite resources to meet the demands of the organization (or an OSS project) his/her 
performance will suffer and s/he is more likely to quit (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). Developers 
with longer tenure are more likely to have scaled contribution barrier because they have had 
more time to develop programming skills and to acclimatize themselves with the complex 
architecture of the project and its requirements. Therefore we expect that developers with longer 
tenure are more likely to remain active in projects.  
Furthermore, the higher the number of projects the developer is contributing to, the more 
is the effort required to scale the contribution barriers erected by different projects. However, it 
may also allow them develop broader and more portable skills. Even so, working on multiple 
projects at one time places more demands on developers in terms of their attention and the time 
spent contributing. Therefore, we expect that developers who contribute to more number of 
projects are more likely to become inactive.   
Finally, projects employ developers performing different activities ranging from clerical 
to highly intellectual (von Krogh et al. 2003). Since enjoyment in programming is an important 
motivator for OSS developers to contribute (Shah 2006), the role of the developers is likely to 
influence their decisions to remain active in the project. Roles requiring intellectually 
challenging tasks may be more motivating for developers to contribute and to remain active in a 
project than roles with more mundane responsibilities.  
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2.1.2 Project Level Factors 
We focus on two project level factors that may affect developers’ perception of the vitality of the 
project – project age and project size. Our argument relies on the notions of the liability of 
newness and the liability of smallness of OSS projects (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). The 
liability of newness suggests that a newer project will be perceived as less legitimate because it 
has had less time to establish clear governance procedures such as recruitment strategies, rules 
for peer review process and conflict resolution. In addition such a project has had less time to 
establish its credibility among the developers and the supporting social network structure, such 
as a helpful user community, that may submit bug reports and feature requests (Chengalur-Smith 
et al. 2010). Such projects may find it difficult to retain developers. On the other hand, the 
projects that have had more time to mature may be in more advanced stages of development and 
more active (Crowston and Scozzi 2002). Such mature projects may appeal to the developers 
given their greater activity and vitality (Choi et al. 2010). Therefore, we expect older projects to 
have lower mean turnover rates.  
OSS projects are also likely to be susceptible to the liability of smallness which suggests 
that smaller projects may be perceived as having less pragmatic legitimacy resulting in a 
difficulty to attract and retain developers (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). Size of the developer 
base is also important in attracting additional collaborators as it may be considered a sign of 
vitality of the project (Choi et al. 2010). Larger projects with more developers may provide more 
opportunities for learning and building reputation for developers along with giving them a sense 
of importance of the project (Chengalur-Smith et al. 2010). Therefore we expect larger projects 
to have lower mean turnover rates.   
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2.2 METHODOLOGY 
To explore and explain the nature and impact of a developer and project variables on turnover, 
we used archival data. The sample of projects and participants was drawn from SourceForge 
(www.SourceForge.net). SourceForge provides open source developers with a centralized place 
to manage their development and includes communication tools, version control processes, and 
repositories for managing source code. It is one of the largest open source repositories, estimated 
to host over 168,000 projects (Madey and Christley 2008).  
The sample contained data for 40 currently active projects on SourceForge and 201 
developers. The projects were chosen on the basis of their overall activity levels (SourceForge 
provides a list of projects that have been most active during their development). All the selected 
projects had to be currently active (i.e. at least one developer currently working on them) and 
have CVS/SVN repositories on SourceForge that could be mined for developer activity levels. In 
many instances projects had separate websites and hosted their CVS/SVN repositories outside 
SourceForge. In other cases projects did not provide all the data that we needed. Such projects 
were dropped from our data set. SourceForge also provides a webpage for each developer which 
contains information about developers’ joining date, current activity, projects that they contribute 
to and their roles in the projects.  
2.2.1 Developer Level Variables  
The following five developer level (level 1) variables, including the outcome variable, turnover, 
were collected – 
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 Turnover – We scanned for developer activity on CVS/SVN code repositories of the 
projects. Each project maintains such a code repository that contains the complete history 
of its development. The code repository can be scanned for individual developer activity 
history. Turnover was operationalized as a binary outcome variable. A developer was 
deemed active, coded as 0, if at least one CVS/SVN commit was made by him/her in a 2 
month period (March 25th 2010 to May 25th 2010). On the other hand, s/he was deemed 
inactive, coded as 1, if s/he had made no commits to the code repository in that period. 
Since it is difficult to predict when turnover has happened, such an approach is 
reasonable. Joyce and Kraut (2006) also followed a similar approach in their study of 
turnover from online newsgroups, however they chose an observation period of six 
months to determine turnover. Our choice of a two month period seemed reasonable for 
an exploratory study in an open source context since such projects require more active 
developer attention than online newsgroups.        
 Role of the Developer – We collected the data for the role of each individual developer 
from the project webpages. A project may employ developers for various roles that range 
in the level and kind of expertise required
6
.  Since we did not find enough developers for 
each of the possible roles, and on noting that the two most frequently employed roles 
                                                 
6
 Some examples of roles developers may perform in the project are as administrators, developers, document 
writers, project managers, packagers, web designers, translators, support technician, cross platform porter, all hands 
person etc.  
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were those of Developer and Administrator, we created two dummy variables 
“Developer” and “Admin” with the base group “Other” (which included all other roles)7.  
 Number of Projects – We collected the data for the number of OSS projects undergoing 
active development that the developer was involved in by scanning individual developer 
webpages.  
 Tenure – We approximate the tenure of a developer in months by using the date of 
joining SourceForge.net. The longer the developer has been on SourceForge, the greater 
is his/her chances of having gained enough technical and programming knowledge to 
overcome the contribution barrier of a project they may wish to contribute to
8
.       
2.2.2 Project Level Variables  
The following project level variables (level 2) were collected – 
Project Age – The date the project was registered is available on SourceForge. We 
calculate the age in number of months since its registration.  
Size of Project – The number of developers listed on the project’s webpage.  
                                                 
7
 As evident from Table 1, roughly 25% roles belonged to the Other category. Since Developer and Admin 
dummies are correlated we also analyzed the data by merging Other and Admin categories to create a single 
Developer dummy variable. In doing so we found that the HLM results did not change appreciably.       
8 
Since it is difficult to judge when a developer actually starts working on a project, we used their tenure on 
SourceForge.net as a proxy. For future work, we are considering operationalizing tenure as the period elapsed since 
their first contribution to the focal project, which may be a more robust way of approximating tenure.       
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2.3 STATISTICAL MODELS AND RESULTS  
Modeling the effects of developer level and project level variables together presents considerable 
conceptual and methodological challenges. The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) technique 
allows researchers to model developer level outcomes within projects and model any between 
project differences that arise. Newer versions of HLM also allow appropriate estimating 
techniques for dichotomous dependent variables, such as turnover. HLM also allows multivariate 
tests based on comparing model deviances (-2 Log Likelihood at convergence) using the Laplace 
Estimation method (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Deviance (-2LL) is a measure of model fit; the 
smaller the deviance is the better is the model fit.  
The study was carried out in two parts and follows the approach recommended by 
Rumberger (1995). In the first part a developer model of turnover was developed and tested with 
logistic regression using only developer level variables. This allows an analysis focused only on 
developer level variables. However, this not only ignores project level variables but also assumes 
that the effects of developer level variables on turnover do not vary from project to project. This 
assumption was tested in the second part of the study.  
In the second part of the study logistic HLM analysis was performed. The developer level 
model used in this part of the study was based on the results of the first part. It allowed us to 
focus the analysis on explaining between project differences in the predicted mean turnover rates 
(turnover characteristics adjusted for differences in developer characteristics between projects) 
and between project differences in the effects of developer level variables on turnover rates. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of variables at individual and 
project levels. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Developer level 
(n=201) 
Mean  s.d. 1 2 4 5 
1. Tenure 83.01 36.891 -    
2. Number of Projects 2.92 2.763 .325** -   
3. Turnover (DV) .62 .486 .136 -.026 -  
4. Developer .42 .495 .038 -.081 .024 - 
5. Admin .33 .473 -.194** .063 -.189** -.605** 
Project level (n=40) Mean s.d. 1 2   
1. Age 86.25 43.665 -    
2. Size 14.70 23.750 .323* -   
*p < 0.05, **p < .001, two-tailed tests 
2.3.1 Logistic Models  
A series of linear logistic models were developed and tested to measure the effect of developer 
level variables on turnover behavior. Turnover is a binary dependent variable that can be 
expressed as a probability pi, which takes on the value of unity if the developer i becomes 
inactive in the project, zero otherwise. The probability p is transformed into log of odds (or logit) 
which is expressed as:  
Log [pi / (1-pi)] = β0 + β1 Tenure + β2 Developer + β3 Admin + β4 Number_of_Projects 
Logistic Regression was carried out in two steps. In the first step univariate estimates 
were computed for all the level 1 independent variables. In the next step we estimated the full 
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multivariate model using the forced entry method. Table 2 presents the exponentiated logistic 
coefficients, which represent the ratio of predicted odds of turnover with a one unit increase in 
the independent variable to the predicted odds without one unit increase. Thus, a value of one 
signifies no change in the odds of turnover. A value greater than (less than) one indicates that the 
odds of turnover increase (decrease) due to a unit change in independent variable.  
         Table 2. Predicted odds of turnover 
Variable Univariate estimates Multivariate estimates 
Admin .443* .320* 
Developer 1.104 .524 
Tenure 1.008 1.007 
Number_of_Projects .981 .955 
-2LL (initial = 266.583)  254.268 
Cox and Snell R
2
  .059 
Nagelkerke R
2
 
Δχ2  = 12.311* (p < .050) 
 .081 
     *p < 0.05, **p < .001  
The univariate and multivariate estimates of “Admin” are both significant and suggest 
that administrators have 44.3% lower odds of turnover than the “Other” category. This means 
that administrators are more than twice as likely to remain active than developers with “Other” 
roles. Since “Admin” was significant in the univariate and multivariate estimates it was retained 
for further HLM analysis.      
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2.3.2 HLM Models 
HLM analysis requires two types of models: a level 1 model to estimate the effects of developer 
level variables on turnover and a level 2 model to estimate the effect of project level variables on 
the coefficients of the level 1 analysis. HLM analysis allows for the estimated coefficients from 
the level 1 model to vary across projects and any such difference can be modeled with project 
level variables. We begin the analysis by modeling the unconditional model (base model) with 
no predictors at either level.  
2.3.3 Unconditional Model   
Log [pij / (1-pij)] = β0j 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
This model allows us to ascertain the variability in the outcome variable at each of the two levels 
i.e. within project and between project variability. The results are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Unconditional Model 
Fixed effect  Coefficient se p value 
Average project mean γ00  .484 .183 0.012 
Random effect Variance component df χ2 p value 
Project mean, uoj .314 39 57.48 .028 
Deviance (-2LL) 631.288    
Estimated parameters 2    
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The Null hypothesis H0: τ00 = 0 is rejected (p = .028). This suggests that significant 
variation exists among projects in their turnover rates. The intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) measures the proportion of total variance in the outcome that is between projects, i.e. 
level-2 (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). Resulting ICC values for our analysis suggest that 8.71% 
variation in turnover that can be explained by level-2 predictors resides between projects
9
. 
Further, for a project with a typical turnover rate (with u0j = 0), the expected log odds of turnover 
is .484. This corresponds to a probability of 1/ (1 + e
 (.484)
) = .38.  This means that for a typical 
developer in a typical project there is a 38% chance of turnover in a 2 month period.    
2.3.4 Conditional Model  
This model allows part of the variation in the intercept β0 (mean turnover rates) to be explained 
by project level variables (project age and size),  
Log [pij / (1-pij)] = β0j + β1j Admin 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Proj_Age + γ02 Proj_Size + u0j 
β1j = γ10 
All the variables were grand mean centered. This centering approach facilitates the 
interpretation of the results and also lessens multicollinearity in group level estimation by 
reducing the correlation between the group level intercept and slope estimates (Raudenbush 
1989). Table 4 presents the results of the conditional model.   
                                                 
9
 Level-1 variance for logistic HLM models is given by      while level-2 variance (τ00) is the variance 
component of u00 (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).   
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Table 4. Conditional Model 
Fixed effect Coefficient se  p value 
Average project mean γ00 .760** .210  0.001 
Proj_Age Slope γ01 .010* .004  0.035 
Proj_Size Slope γ02 -0.015* 0.006  0.028 
Admin Slope γ10 -1.013** 0.360  0.006 
Random effect Variance component df χ2 p value 
Project mean, uoj 0.102 37 41.355 .286 
Deviance (-2LL) 617.781    
Estimated parameters  5    
 
The Null hypothesis H0: τ00 = 0 fails to be rejected (p = .286). This means that after 
controlling for project size and age no significant variation remains to be explained. The 
proportion of reduction in variance or variance explained at level 2 is .6751, implying that 
project size and age account for 67.51% of the explained variance at level 2. The Deviance (-2 
Log Likelihood) is also significantly improved from the base model (ΔD = 13.50, χ2df = 3, p = 
.004), suggesting a good model fit and a fully identified model
10
.        
We find that project administrators are 1/ (1 + e
 (1.013)
) = 26.63% less likely to turnover in 
the 2 month period than the “other” group, after controlling for other effects in the model. 
Additionally, project age and size have small but significant positive and negative effects on 
                                                 
10
 A conditional model that included all developer level variables did not further improve deviance and was 
rejected in favor of the more parsimonious model presented here.      
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developer turnover respectively. A unit increase in project age increases the log-odds of turnover 
by 0.010, while a unit increase in project size reduces it by .015, all other things being equal.   
2.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Like all empirical work this study is limited in many ways. First, the sample is biased toward 
more active projects. Such projects may have well developed infrastructures allowing retention 
of active members and/or a constant inflow of newer active members. Including less active 
projects in the future should allow for more robust and generalizable results. Second, the use of 
binary variable for turnover leads to loss of variance information. Some developers are more 
active than others and are more likely to stay active and our analysis should take this into 
account. To address this issue in future models we will use each developer's participation history 
to calculate a probability of turnover. Similar techniques have been used in marketing research to 
calculate the probability that a customer with a given pattern of transactions is still alive 
(Schmittlein et al., 1987). Finally we will seek a conceptual integration of developer and project 
level factors in modeling turnover rather than just an empirical integration. While the initial 
empirical integration lays the groundwork for simultaneous study of individual and project level 
factors, additional conceptual integration is needed for a complete understanding of turnover in 
open source projects. We consider this study as an important first step toward this end.  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this preliminary study, we modeled turnover behavior of core open source contributors using 
logistic hierarchical linear modeling approach. We argue that taking both the developer and the 
project level factors into account will lead to a richer understanding of the issue of turnover in 
open source projects. Our analysis suggests that developer role, project size and project age are 
important predictors of turnover. We find that there exists a significant variation in mean 
turnover rates among projects on SourceForge and that project age and project size account for a 
sizable proportion of this variation. An understanding of factors that affect turnover in OSS 
projects may prove valuable for project managers and allow them to make more informed 
decisions in managing the volunteer developer work force. The IS research community will also 
benefit from the improved understanding of the interplay of factors across levels in managing 
volunteer contributions in virtual teams.  
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3.0 STUDY 2: THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN 
PREDICTING DEVELOPER TURNOVER IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
PROJECTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
As mentioned earlier, in this study we propose a conceptual integration of developer and project 
level variables to analyze turnover. Previous OSS research has neglected the role of the 
organization structure (ownership) of OSS communities on member retention. Further, this 
research has neglected the inherently nested nature of the developer and project variables. In 
order to address these limitations and expand the existing research, this study develops a 
Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) of turnover behavior in OSS. The analysis focuses on two 
levels: the developer level, which examines factors that may affect developers’ decisions to 
become inactive, and the project level, which examines the factors that may influence the rates of 
turnover among projects. This study also compares various measures of developer turnover in the 
OSS context. In what follows, we present a brief background of the Ownership and Social 
Identity Theory literatures. This is followed by the hypotheses and the methodology sections 
where we outline the testable hypotheses and the empirical methods used in the study. Finally we 
conclude by noting the limitations of this work and suggesting the steps we intend to take in the 
future to further improve this study.    
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this section, we outline the current state of research in the Employee Ownership literature and 
the Social Identity literature. 
3.2.1 Employee Ownership 
In Sociological and Economic literature on organizations, a firm is often seen as composed of 
four classes of actors: shareholders, board of directors, executives, managers and owners (Kang 
and Sorensen, 1999). Shareholders are often thought of as owners of the firm and hence this 
literature has often used “equity stake” or “share/stock value” as a proxy to operationalize their 
level of ownership. However, there are other possible forms of organization; for example, 
owners may be workers (employee owned companies). In entrepreneurial firms, one person may 
perform all the tasks (Kang and Sorensen, 1999). A common motivation to introduce employee 
ownership in traditional firms has been to increase worker and firm productivity (Pierce and 
Rodgers, 2004). In the OSS context, projects have tended to use ownership of modules for 
effectively managing the code production, avoiding chaotic code changes, and as a way to 
recognize the expertise of an owner-developer (Mockus et al., 2002).         
Ownership literature has conceptualized ownership as a dual conceptualization; firstly as 
an objective and real state (i.e. formal ownership) and secondly as a perceived state (i.e. 
psychological). While formal ownership is viewed as an objective reality and is often seen is a 
“bundle of rights”, psychological ownership is viewed as a reflective and experienced state 
achieved due to the reality of possession (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). This psychological state is 
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more likely to be created when the formal ownership allows control over the owned object, 
knowledge of the object, and an investment in an object (Pierce et al. 2001). In the OSS context, 
formal ownership is accorded only to developers who have shown expertise with the project code 
and who have invested their time in developing it. Therefore, it is very likely that the formal 
ownership arrangement in OSS leads to a feeling of psychological ownership among developers.     
Pierce et. al. (2001) argued that ownership can be seen as fulfilling three basic human 
desires: 
1) Efficacy and Effectance:  Ownership and the rights that come with it, allow 
individuals to feel in control and give them the ability to alter their environment, thus satisfying 
their innate need to be efficacious (Beggan, 1991).  
2) Self-Identity: Possessions serve as a symbolic expression of self and they are 
closely connected to the perception of self-identity and people use ownership for the purpose of 
defining themselves and expressing their identity to others (Pierce et al. 2001). Possessions play 
a dominant role in forming an owner’s identity and become a part of their extended selves (Belk, 
1988). In fact, ownership and identity may be so strongly related that people may engage in 
territorial behaviors to identify and defend their possessions (Brown et. al. 2005). To quote 
Sartre (1969),  
“I am what I have; What is mine is myself” 
3) Having a Place (Belongingness): Possessions also allow people to fulfill their 
need to “dwell” and they may devote significant resources to targets that may potentially become 
their homes (Pierce et al., 2001). When people feel like owners in an organization, their need for 
belongingness is met by “having a place” in terms of their needs being met (Avey et. al. 2009).        
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Therefore, the positive effects of ownership are generally hypothesized because of the 
sense of fulfillment, self-esteem and the enhancement to ego it provides. When employees feel 
ownership in an organization, they feel a sense of responsibility toward it and tend to engage in 
positive behaviors (Avey et. al. 2009). Additionally, Beggan (1992) confirmed the existence of 
“mere ownership effect”, the hypothesis that owners rate a target object much more favorably 
than non-owners. Because people perceive their possessions as an extension of their self-
identities, they maintain enhanced perceptions of what they own, in order to maintain their 
positive identities. The mere ownership effect serves as a basis of motivation to maintain a 
positive self-image (Beggan, 1992). Furthermore, he found this effect despite the time people 
had to ruminate about the object, thereby suggesting that mere knowledge of ownership is 
enough for this effect to take hold, irrespective of the time the object was owned.    
 3.2.2 Social Identity Theory 
The argument that people seek motivation for self-enhancement through their possessions is 
analogous to the idea proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1985) in Social Identity Theory (SIT) that 
people make biased judgments in favor of their groups to enhance their individual self-esteem. 
SIT posits that people tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories, such 
as groups, teams or affiliation (Tajfel and Turner, 1985). A major reason for maintaining this 
classification is to find a sense of “belongingness” and maintain positive self-image. The desire 
to maintain a positive self-image is so strong that people tend to associate themselves with 
successful others even when the connection may be incidental or meaningless. The desire to 
maintain an association with another successful entity means that negative feedback on the 
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group’s functioning may cause people to end their association, the so called cutting off the 
reflected failure syndrome (Snyder et. al. 1986). On the other hand, De Cremer et. al. (2002) 
showed that under circumstances of negative feedback, some people may actually increase their 
association and responsibility to the group. They argued that the kind of reaction people show to 
group failure may well depend on how strongly people feel associated to the group.  
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1985) suggests that people’s social identities 
may be positively or negatively affected according to the evaluations of those groups to which 
they belong. If the group’s status (or success) is lower in comparison to other relevant groups, 
people’s social identities may be threatened. In such cases SIT posits that people may respond in 
one of the following manner:  
1) Individual Mobility:  Individuals may leave or dissociate themselves from their 
erstwhile group and seek to join a better group. However, this option may not always be readily 
available to people, as joining other groups may not always be feasible (Ellemers et. al., 1988).    
2) Social Competition: Individuals may respond by working harder to make the 
group successful, so that its status relative to other groups may be enhanced.  
3) Social Creativity: Individuals may respond by changing the comparison criteria to 
a new dimension or changing the values assigned to the attributes so that previously negative 
comparisons are now perceived positive (Tajfel and Turner, 1985).       
In the next section, we will develop our hypotheses regarding developer turnover in OSS 
context using the Ownership literature and Social Identity Theory as our bases.  
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3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
OSS participants differ from each other, most conspicuously in the rights and duties and the 
accompanying ownership stakes they have in the project. In Sociology and Organizational 
Behavior literature, an employee’s ownership stake in a firm is often seen as a “bundle” of rights, 
powers and privileges (Kang and Sorensen, 1999). Formal employee ownership in a firm is 
frequently associated with rights to (1) possess some share of the owned object, (2) exercise 
influence (control) over the owned object, and (3) acquire the information about the status of that 
which is owned (Pierce et al., 1991). This literature has also studied how varying levels of 
employee ownership affect employees’ job attitudes such as turnover and work effectiveness. 
Workers-owners of the firm (shareholders) were found to have significantly higher levels of 
organizational commitment and lesser levels of turnover than non-shareholders (Long, 1980; 
Pierce et. al., 1991). Hammer et al. (1981), while studying the link between ownership and 
absenteeism concluded that ownership creates a mechanism through which employees perceive 
that their voices may be heard in bringing about organizational change. Thus formal ownership 
may create a perception of holding a position of influence and involvement in decision making, 
thereby generating a sense of responsibility toward the firm and higher levels of interest and 
commitment to it.             
In the OSS context, participants may also have varying ownership levels and possess the 
corresponding levels of rights (for example, Google Code participants can be sole owners, part 
owners, committers or contributors)
11
. Owners (and part owners) possess the highest levels of 
                                                 
11
 http://code.google.com/p/support/wiki/Permissions  
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rights which include the ability to make changes to the project structure, code and workforce (i.e. 
they can move people in or out of the project). Committers possess the ability to make changes to 
the code but not the larger project structure or the workforce. Contributors, on the other hand, 
possess much restricted rights and can only post comments and point out issues in the code; 
however their rights may be upgraded to include code commits. This phenomenon is consistent 
with Russell’s (1985) view that ownership systems can be differentiated by the extent to which 
they permit rights to be exercised.  Prior literature in OSS has studied how participants are 
accorded progressively higher rights, duties and the accompanying ownership of the project code 
(von Krogh et al. 2003). To be accorded these rights, participants need to demonstrate their 
interest, skill and understanding of the code structure.  Mockus et al. (2002) studied the process 
through which developers are selected and granted ownership of project modules based on their 
skills and expertise
12
. Since participants with higher levels of ownership are more likely to be 
committed to the development, we propose the following main effect of ownership (level 1 
variable) on turnover:  
Hypothesis 1: An OSS participant’s level of ownership in the project will be negatively 
associated with turnover. Specifically, we hypothesize that sole owners will be least likely to 
turnover from a project followed by part owners, committers and contributors respectively.  
                                                 
12
 Different projects may follow different strategies to accord ownership rights. Apache project for example, 
follows an emergent ownership structure where some participants emerged as “de facto” owners of modules through 
their continued code development and commitment to a module. Mozilla on the other hand, follows an “enforced” 
ownership strategy where every change to the code is reviewed by the module owner (Mockus et al. 2002).              
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As mentioned earlier, OSS developers may work simultaneously on a number of projects 
with possibly different ownership levels in each. A given developer may be the sole owner in 
one project, co-owner in second, and committer in third. Yet another developer may work on a 
single project as an owner. Role theory argues such multiple relationships with multiple roles 
may be the cause of psychological stress. For example, Goode (1960) argued that “role strain” is 
a natural consequence of performing multiple roles. Role strain comprises of two overlapping 
problems: role overload which refers to constraints imposed by time, and role conflict which 
refers to discrepant expectations in performing roles irrespective of time (Sieber, 1974). Based 
on this we may assume that multiplication of roles causes burden on people and inhibits their 
ability to contribute to projects. However, the Theory of Role Accumulation suggests the 
following positive outcomes of multiple roles: (1) Overall status security and buffers against 
failure, (2) role privileges, (3) resources for status enhancement and role performance, and (4) 
enrichment of the personality and ego gratification (Sieber, 1974). Thus, role accumulation 
provides a psychological mechanism through which developers may be able to raise their 
performance levels. In addition, developers working on multiple projects may be able to apply 
skills learned from one context to the other with greater efficiency than others. However, Sieber 
(1974) does not deny the inevitability of role overload. Therefore we propose a curvilinear main 
effect for the number of projects a developer is involved in (level 2 variable) on turnover: 
Hypothesis 2: Overall, the number of projects a developer is associated with has a U-
shaped relationship with turnover in a given project. Specifically, the probability of developer 
turnover will decrease up to a point as the number of projects the developer is associated with 
on increases, after which it will increase.  
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However, as the number of projects a developer works on increase, their perception of 
level of “belongingness” may decrease and chances of individual mobility may increase. Such 
developers may not feel too attached to a project and may also have other projects they may 
seamlessly move into. Because “sole owners” have the greatest burden of responsibilities, in 
terms of managing and overseeing the project, they may find it increasingly difficult to devote 
time to a given project when there are other projects which require their attention at the same 
time. Since their sense of “belongingness” may be diminished, sole owners may be more likely 
to ignore certain projects in order to manage their workload better. Part owners, on the other 
hand, may rely on the shared ownership structure to leverage help from others in sharing their 
burden. Committers and Contributors may also be able to retain activity by sharing the workload 
with others. However, since the continuum of ownership levels from sole owners to contributors 
represents a decreasing burden of rights and duties, it is likely that lower levels of ownership 
may allow developers retain their associations with multiple projects.   
Hypothesis 3: The number of currently active projects a developer is associated with, 
will moderate the relationship between the level of ownership of the developer and turnover in 
that project. Specifically, as the number of associations increase, developers with higher level of 
ownership in the focal project will be more likely to leave than developers with lower levels of 
ownership.  
As proposed by SIT, people strive to maintain positive identities through their social 
associations. If their identities are threatened due to low group status or failure they may 
disassociate from the group. Therefore we propose the following main effect of project success 
(level 2 variable) on turnover,   
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Hypothesis 4: Overall, the success of the OSS project is negatively related to turnover in 
that project. Specifically, as the project success increases the chances of a developer working in 
it leaving are reduced. 
However, SIT also proposes that people may also respond to group failure by committing 
more to the group thereby facilitating its success (Social Competition). Here we argue that the 
decisions developers take, i.e. whether to leave or stay in a failing project, may well depend on 
their level of ownership in the project. De Cremer et. al. (2002) found that when group members 
received negative feedback, their decision to dissociate from the group often depended on their 
level of identification with the group. Developer-Owners of an OSS project achieve their status 
either by starting a new project or by demonstrating their expertise through contribution and 
commitment to the project. Such developers are also likely to strive to maintain their position 
and justify their past association with the project. Indeed, project escalation literature has 
similarly argued that managers may maintain their commitment levels to sinking projects in 
order to justify the sunk costs (Keil et. al. 1995). In OSS context, the sunk costs are likely to be 
the psychological association with the project and the effort spent on it. Therefore we propose 
the following interaction effect of ownership (level-1 variable) and project success (level-2 
variable) on turnover,     
Hypothesis 5: The success of the OSS project will moderate the relationship between the 
level of ownership of developer and turnover in that project. Specifically, as the project success 
decreases, developers with higher level of ownership will be less likely to leave than developers 
with lower levels of ownership. 
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3.4 DATA AND MEASURES 
Data for this research were collected from Google Code. Google code provides open source 
participants with a centralized place to manage their development and includes communication 
tools, version control processes, and repositories for source code. It is one of the largest open 
source repositories and is estimated to host over 237,802 projects (as of February 2012) out of 
which over 71,091 projects were active
13
. We designed a Web Crawler for the purpose of 
collecting the developer level and project level data using the R programming environment (R 
Development Core Team, 2011). Web Crawlers have been used in previous research to collect 
data on OSS projects (e.g., Setia et al. 2010). Additional developer activity data was collected by 
downloading the project repositories and parsing them using the CVSAnalY software
14
. This 
software allowed us to parse project repositories and store developer contribution data in a 
MySQL database.   
In the initial stage, data were collected for 5,500 top listed projects on Google code in 
August, 2012
15
. These included project level data and a list of 13,989 unique developers who 
contributed to these projects. This set of 5,500 projects and 13,989 developers form our initial 
sample. In the next stage, additional project level data were collected for 22,948 other projects 
that the core set of developers additionally work on, but that do not fall in our core sample of 
5,500 projects. Thus, all 13,989 developers fall under the 28,448 projects.  
                                                 
13
 We got these numbers by querying the February, 2012 Google code database dump, hosted by Flossmole. 
http://code.google.com/p/flossmole/   
14
 http://git.libresoft.es/cvsanaly/ 
15
 http://code.google.com/hosting/search?q=&btn=Search+Projects  
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3.4.1 Sample Inclusion Criteria  
Once we had captured the initial dataset, we applied various sample inclusion criteria on project 
characteristics in order to select the appropriate sample of projects and developers that reflect the 
population that we sought to generalize our results to.    
We represent the sample inclusion criteria as a set of filters that were applied to the initial 
sample of 5500 projects (Figure 1 represents the process): 
 Filter 1: We excluded projects of size 1, i.e. projects with only one developer, since 
involvement in such a project may not be meaningful as a group process such as social 
identity. Stewart et. al. (2006) also used a similar exclusion criterion.  
 Filter 2: Out of a total of 2111 projects that were left post filter 1, about 82% used SVN 
based version control system, while 11% used Mercurial and 7% used GIT systems. Due 
to the differences in the way workflow is organized in these source code management 
systems, Rodriguez-Bustos and Aponte (2012) found differences among developer 
contributions when projects migrated from one system to the other. Therefore, in order to 
control for any differences among projects that use SVN versus GIT or Mercurial, we 
excluded projects that used Mercurial or GIT repositories.  
 Filter 3: In the next stage we excluded either projects whose source code could not be 
read and parsed, or did not exist anymore, or were moved to different project hosting 
sites such as GitHub or SourceForge. In order to flag projects that had possibly migrated, 
we performed automated text analysis of project descriptions using keywords such as 
“migrate”, “move”, “GitHub”, and “SourceForge”. The project descriptions of projects 
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were then manually checked in order to make sure to exclude projects that had actually 
migrated to other hosting sites.   
 Filter 4: In the next step, we excluded projects that either were course or class related and 
hence potentially temporary (e.g. https://code.google.com/p/swe574-group2-
spring2013/), hosted only documents and not code, were test projects created by 
developers to test the Google code environment (e.g., 
https://code.google.com/p/211227358-testproject/), or were sponsored by a company 
such as Google. In order to flag projects that were possibly course related, we performed 
automated text analysis of project descriptions using keywords such as “course”, 
“assignment”, “student”, “university”, “school”, “college”. The project descriptions of 
projects were then manually checked in order to make sure to exclude projects that were 
actually course or assignment related and hence potentially temporary. This allowed us to 
retain projects that were the product of individual developers working under self-volition, 
and voluntary basis.   
 Filter 5: In the final step, we excluded projects that showed no activity in the 30 day 
period prior to data collection. This was done to ensure that only currently active projects 
were included in the sample. Stewart et. al. (2006) also used a similar exclusion criterion.  
          
The final sample consisted of 446 projects and 2949 unique developers. The project 
repositories of these 446 projects were parsed and stored in a MySQL database using the 
CVSAnalY software in order to analyze individual developer activities. The 2949 developers in 
this sample also worked on other 4445 “secondary” projects that did not overlap with the “focal” 
sample of 446 projects. Thus, all the 2949 unique developers work under 4891 projects.    
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Figure 1. Sample Inclusion Process 
3.4.2 Developer Level Variables 
The following developer level variables, including the outcome variable, turnover, were 
collected – 
a) Dependent Variable (Turnover): Measuring turnover in a voluntary non-
contractual setting (such as OSS) is a non-trivial problem since the developers may go inactive 
for an elongated period of time, and then may return. The current research approach to measure 
turnover in such settings is to observe inactivity over an elongated, often arbitrary, period of time 
(e.g. Joyce and Kraut, 2006). However, this approach results in right-censored measurement of 
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turnover, since a developer may return after the observation period has ended. Since, to the best 
of author’s knowledge, there are no established methods to measure turnover in the OSS context, 
we use Schmittlein et. al’s (1987) Pareto/NBD approach to operationalize turnover. Originally 
proposed in the Marketing literature to track a customer’s lifetime value in a non-contractual 
setting, this approach assumes that customers buy at a steady (albeit stochastic) rate for a period 
of time and then become inactive. The time to dropout is modeled using the Pareto (exponential-
gamma mixture) timing model, and the repeat buying behavior is modeled using the NBD 
(Poisson-Gamma mixture) counting model. This approach has been shown to work quite well in 
modeling actual customer behavior based on their past buying behavior (Fader et. al. 2005). We 
argue that a similar approach can be used to track developer contributions and model their 
lifetime and dropout behaviors.   
In this approach a developer’s activity on the code (i.e. code commit) may be considered 
an “event” (analogous to a “purchase” event). A developer who is active is considered “Alive”, 
while a developer that is inactive for any reason is considered “Dead”. A developer who is active 
at time t = 0 is observed up to a suitable time “T”. During this observation period, the developer 
makes “X” number of code commits with the last commit coming at time “TX”, 0 < TX ≤ T. The 
value “X” is considered the “Frequency” of commit activity while “TX” is considered “Recency”. 
The Pareto/NBD approach then allows us to calculate the conditional probability that the 
developer is still alive after the observation period, P(Alive|(X, TX, T), subject to the following 
assumptions outlined by Schmittlein et al. (1987):     
 While alive, a developer makes commits to the code according to a Poisson 
process with a rate λ. The Poisson process implies exponentially distributed interpurchasing 
times with the resulting “lack of memory” property (Schmittlein et. al. 1987). This is a 
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reasonable assumption in the OSS context since the development of code is not bound by any 
regular schedule, and a developer may have a constant probability to contribute to the code.  
 Each developer remains alive for a lifetime which has an exponentially distributed 
duration with death rate μ. The events that could trigger “death” (such as a new career, lifestyle 
change, etc.) may arrive in a Poisson manner. The arrival of all possible death events is the 
superposition of the individual events, and is best approximated as a Poisson process (Karlin and 
Taylor, 1975). Thus, this assumption is also reasonable in the OSS context.  
 The activity rate λ and the death rate μ for different developers are distributed 
according to different gamma distributions in the population. Further, λ and μ are distributed 
independently of each other. It is reasonable to assume that different developers have different 
activity and death rates. Some developers are more active than others and other developers may 
become disenchanted with the project sooner than others. The gamma is a flexible distribution 
that can capture most reasonable distributions. Further, a frequent developer may become 
disenchanted with the project sooner and die. On the other hand, another developer may become 
more strongly attached to the project. Thus, there is no a-priori reason to favor a positive 
correlation between λ and μ over negative (Schmittlein et. al. 1987).         
Thus, given a developer’s Frequency and Recency profile we can construct a developer’s 
conditional probability of turnover, P(DEATH) as 1 – P(ALIVE|(X, TX, T)). Each OSS project 
maintains a code repository that contains the complete history of its development including each 
individual developer’s activity history. We downloaded the project SVN repositories and parsed 
them into a MySQL database using the CVSAnalY tool. To generate the conditional probability 
we chose to observe the developers for 3 different observation periods of 90, 180, and 270 days 
to capture their activities over a short, medium and long term respectively. Joyce and Kraut 
 l 
 
(2006) also used a similar observation period of 180 days. We queried the MySQL database to 
generate each developer’s Frequency (X) and Recency (TX) profile over the 90, 180 and 270 day 
observation periods.   
We then calculated PDEATH90, PDEATH180 and PDEATH270 as three separate 
outcome variables for each developer in our sample using the “Buy-Till-You-Die”(BTYD) 
package in R (Dziurzynski, Wadsworth, Fader et. al. 2012)
16
. As we argue later in the paper, 
further analysis allowed us to select one of the most appropriate among the three outcome 
variables, which was then used for modeling the turnover behavior using developer and project 
level predictor variables. 
There are several advantages to using the Pareto/NBD approach over heuristic 
approaches that have been used in the past. One heuristic approach that has been applied is to 
deem a developer inactive if he/she has been inactive for at least a given period of time (Joyce 
and Kraut, 2006; Sharma et. al. 2012). Such a heuristic ignores a developer’s historic pattern of 
activity and does not allow us to generate a probability measure (Schmittlein et. al. 1987). It also 
leads to a loss in information by neglecting to differentiate between more frequently active 
developers from less active ones. Furthermore, once the developer has been deemed inactive it 
ignores their possibility of a comeback. Unlike the heuristic approaches, the Pareto/NBD 
approach not only takes into account “how many distinct days of activity” were shown by a 
developer but also the “recent most activity”. An added advantage of the Pareto/NBD approach 
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 Since the outcome variables are proportions, it is recommended that the arcsine transformations (i.e. sin
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(√PDEAD)) be performed in order to normalize the distribution (Hogg and Craig, 1995). Our results remained 
unchanged when using the transformed version of the DVs. Hence we report our results using the untransformed 
versions for ease of interpretation.      
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is the ability to predict future activity levels of developers (expected number of commits in the 
future). This can allow researchers and OSS managers to not only predict the available active 
workforce in the future and manage the project accordingly, but also to calculate the expected 
number of commits for the project in the future by summing over the expectations of the current 
developer base(Schmittlein et. al. 1987).                      
b) Ownership level of developer: As mentioned earlier, Google Code lists the 
ownership status of a developer as an owner, co-owner, committer or contributor. We used 3 
dummy variables, “Part Owner Dummy”, “Committer Dummy” and “Contributor Dummy”, to 
capture the different levels of ownership, with “Sole Owner” as the reference group.           
c) Number of Projects a developer is associated with: We collected the number of 
projects a developer is associated with, “Number of Projects”. This information is available on 
each developer’s profile page on Google code along with the corresponding ownership level. 
Further, to explore any possible curvilinear effects (i.e. H2), we also calculated (Number of 
Projects)
 2
.   
3.4.3 Project Level Variables 
The following project level variables were collected – 
Project Success: Project success in the OSS context can be measured using a variety of 
indicators, since it is a multidimensional construct (Stewart et. al. 2006). A simple and popular 
measure of a project’s “popularity” or its extent of “use” in OSS literature has been the number 
of times a project’s code has been downloaded (Crowston et. al. 2006). However, since older 
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projects have had more time to accumulate the number of downloads, we divided this variable by 
project age and log-transformed it to correct the skew, i.e. “Log (Downloads By Age)”.  
In addition, successful project development also involves interacting with the user and 
developer communities and fulfilling their bugs and feature requests. Google code allows users 
and developers to report “issues” with the project. The proportion of issues resolved by the 
developer team can be a helpful measure of the strength of a project’s processes and ultimately 
its success (Crowston et. al. 2006). Therefore, we calculated the ratio of issues closed by the 
developer team (i.e. resolved) to the number of issues reported, “Proportion of Issues Resolved”, 
as a second measure of project success.     
3.4.4 Project Level Control variables:  
The following variables were used as controls: 
a) Project Age: We controlled for “Project Age”, i.e. the time in years from the first 
code commit made on the project. Chengalur-Smith et al (2010) argued that a new project may 
suffer from the liability of newness which suggests that such a project might be perceived as less 
legitimate because it has had less time to establish clear governance procedures such as 
recruitment strategies, rules for peer review process and conflict resolution. In addition such a 
project has had less time to establish its credibility among the developers and the supporting 
social network structure, such as a helpful user community, that may submit bug reports and 
feature requests. Such projects may find it difficult to retain developers.  
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b) Project size: Butler (2001) has shown that a community’s size may impact the 
level of turnover in it. We controlled for the number of developers working on the project, 
“Number of Developers”. Each project lists the number of developers associated with it.   
c) Project License: License restrictiveness has been to shown to impact the level of 
developer interest in the project (Stewart et. al. 2006). The use of restrictive licenses, i.e. licenses 
with a viral clause (such as the GNU GPL), may affect developers’ and users’ perceptions of 
cost and benefits of developing and using the software by restricting compatibility of code with 
other software products and its commercialization potential. In accordance with Stewart et. al.’s 
(2006) work, we distinguish between projects with and without a license carrying a viral clause. 
In addition, there were a few projects (n=16) which did not clarify the license being used. We 
created 2 dummy variables “Permissive License” and “Other License” with restrictive licenses as 
the reference group.        
We present the descriptive statistics of level-1 and level-2 variables in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively. The correlations among developer Recency (X), Frequency (TX), PALIVE and the 
outcome variable PDEAD are presented in Table 7 for each of the three observation periods. We 
note that all the correlations in Table 7 were significant, and that the correlations are highest 
among the adjacent periods, as was to be expected. The pattern of correlations among X, TX and 
PALIVE/ PDEAD for any given period showed that both Frequency and Recency are correlated 
highly with PALIVE/PDEAD, however that Recency is more strongly correlated than 
Frequency. This suggests that a more recently active developer has more chances of being alive 
than a frequent developer whose last activity was further in the past. This leads to, at first glance 
somewhat counterintuitive, but reasonable suggestion that a developer who might have 
contributed heavily in past has lower probability of being alive than a less frequent developer 
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who contributed very recently. We present some typical examples of developer Recency, 
Frequency and PALIVE values in Table 8. Comparing the developers 5 and 6 we find that even 
though developer 6 did have one activity in the 90 day period, he has lower chances of being 
alive than developer 5 who made no commits during this period. Another interesting observation 
can be made when comparing developers 4 and 5. Even though developer 4 has been more and 
recently active than developer 5, his chances of being alive are slightly lower than developer 5. 
This is because the Pareto/NBD model assumes different activity and death rates among 
developers. A developer who has a history of frequent contributions will have to not only 
maintain the contribution level but will have to be more recently active as well in order to get 
higher PALIVE values. On the other hand, a developer who has been a historically lethargic 
contributor might still have higher chances of being alive because the model assumes a slower 
activity rate for him. This is where the Pareto/NBD crucially differs from the heuristic 
approaches that have been used.       
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Table 5.  Level-1 Descriptive Statistics (Developer Level).  N=2949 
Variable Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
Frequency of Activity during 90 day period (X90) 1.72 6.42 0 62 
Recency of Activity during 90 day period (TX90) 10.40 25.56 0 90 
P(Alive) at the end of  90 day period (PALIVE90) 0.22 0.24 0 1 
P(Dead) at the end of  90 day period (PDEAD90) 0.78 0.24 0 1 
Frequency of Activity during 180 day period (X180) 3.12 11.86 0 124 
Recency of Activity during 180 day period (TX180) 24.11 54.87 0 180 
P(Alive) at the end of  180 day period (PALIVE180) 0.17 0.27 0 1 
P(Dead) at the end of  180 day period (PDEAD180) 0.83 0.27 0 1 
Frequency of Activity during 270 day period (X270) 4.35 16.85 0 199 
Recency of Activity during 270 day period (TX270) 36.45 80.85 0 270 
P(Alive) at the end of  270 day period (PALIVE90) 0.13 0.25 0 1 
P(Dead) at the end of  270 day period (PDEAD270) 0.87 0.25 0 1 
Part Owner Dummy  0.32 0.46 0 1 
Committer Dummy 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Contributor Dummy  0.07 0.26 0 1 
Number of Projects 3.26 5.09 1 144 
(Number of Projects)
2
 36.47 434.04 1 20736 
Part Owner Dummy × Number of Projects 1.37 4.39 0 144 
Committer Dummy × Number of Projects 1.51 3.21 0 99 
Contributor Dummy × Number of Projects 0.14 0.68 0 12 
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Table 6. Level-2 Descriptive Statistics (Project Level).  N=446 
Variable Mean S.D Minimum Maximum 
Project Age (in years) 2.97 1.98 0.03 15.51 
Number of Developers 6.79 7.39 2 51 
Permissive License Dummy 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Other License Dummy 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Proportion of Issues Resolved 0.53 0.34 0 1 
Log (Downloads By Age)  2.92 1.39 -0.66 6.15 
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Table 7. Correlations Among Developer Frequency, Recency, P(Alive) and P(Dead) 
 X90 TX9
0 
PAli
ve90 
PDea
d90 
X180 TX1
80 
PAliv
e180 
PDead
180 
X27
0 
TX2
70 
PAlive
270 
PDead
270 
X90 1 .99 .55 -.55 .92 .89 .34 -.34 .89 .85 .22 -.22 
TX90 .99 1 .60 -.60 .91 .89 .38 -.38 .88 .85 .25 -.25 
PAlive
90 
.55 .60 1 -1 .51 .53 .56 -.56 .50 .51 .44 -.44 
PDead9
0 
-.55 -.60 -1 1 -.51 -.53 -.56 .56 -.50 -.51 -.44 .44 
X180 .92 .91 .51 -.51 1 .99 .49 -.49 .96 .94 .34 -.34 
TX180 .89 .89 .53 -.53 .99 1 .55 -.55 .96 .94 .40 -.40 
PAlive
180 
.34 .38 .56 -.56 .49 .55 1 -1 .48 .51 .67 -.67 
PDead1
80 
-.34 -.38 -.56 .56 -.49 -.55 -1 1 -.48 -.51 -.67 .67 
X270 .89 .88 .50 -.50 .96 .96 .48 -.48 1 .99 .41 -.41 
TX270 .85 .85 .51 -.51 .94 .94 .51 -.51 .99 1 .49 -.49 
PAlive
270 
.22 .25 .44 -.44 .34 .40 .67 -.67 .41 .49 1 -1 
PDead2
70 
-.22 -.25 -.44 .44 -.34 -.40 -.67 .67 -.41 -.49 -1 1 
Note: All correlations are significant at .01 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 8. Typical examples of developer Recency, Frequency and PALIVE 
Developer X90 TX90 PALIVE90 X180 TX180 PALIVE180 X270 TX270 PALIVE270 
1 18 90 1 26 171 .94 41 270 1 
2 24 90 1 60 180 1 92 270 1 
3 1 87 .98 1 87 .52 1 87 .28 
4 0 0 .14 8 166 .93 9 242 .89 
5 0 0 .14 0 0 .06 1 237 .91 
6 1 1 .03 1 1 .00 1 1 .00 
7 1 1 .01 8 158 .87 23 267 .99 
3.5 METHODOLOGY 
Modeling the effects of developer level and project level variables turnover presents considerable 
conceptual and methodological challenges. Most studies in OSS literature focus on activity 
levels in project by considering either the developer level variables (Hertel et. al, 2003; Hars et 
al., 2002), or project level factors such as license choice and organizational sponsorship (Stewart, 
et al 2006). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the studies have looked at turnover in 
open source projects by considering both levels of analysis (see Setia et al. 2010 for an 
exception). Including project level variables in a developer level model is likely to create 
aggregation bias, which can underestimate the effects of variables that are estimated at the 
inappropriate level. While including aggregated values of developer level variables in a project 
level model may fail to fully capture the effects of certain variables (Rumberger, 1995).  
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The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) technique allows researchers to model 
developer level outcomes within projects and model any between project differences that arise as 
a part of the nested design
17
 (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Although we had hypothesized that a 
developer’s characteristics (ownership level, number of project associations) would impact 
turnover from project, there are reasons to believe that such effects may vary across projects. 
Thus, the effect of developer characteristics is nested within the effect of project level 
characteristics. A nested structure of the data also means that the independence of observations 
can no longer be assumed – developers working in one project may be more similar to each other 
than developers working on another project.  HLM relaxes the independence assumption and 
allows information to be analyzed across multiple levels and hence is more robust for multilevel 
data than OLS (Luke, 2004). Finally, our theoretical framework proposes hypotheses that are 
composed of constructs operating and interacting at two levels, thereby suggesting a need for a 
multilevel model.    
There is no single best way to build multilevel models and individual steps that a 
researcher should take in building the models depends on the research questions (Luke, 2004). A 
typical approach requires first testing an unconditional model and incrementally building 
conditional models (Setia et. al. 2010). An unconditional or a “Null” model is a simple one-way 
ANOVA model with random effects. It involves no predictors at any level and is useful to judge 
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 A nested design assumes that a developer works on only one among the 446 “focal” projects. If this 
assumption is not valid then a cross-classified should be considered (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). However, in our 
data set there were only 80 developers, i.e. 2.71% of total 2949, who worked on multiple focal projects. Since there 
is practically no variation for a cross-classified design, we instead chose to randomly delete “extra” developer 
associations within the focal projects. This way each developer worked on only one focal project in our sample as 
required by the nested design.     
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the proportion of variability in the DV (turnover) across the developer and project level 
predictors (i.e. within and between projects). The Null model can be useful tool to judge if a 
multilevel model is warranted in the first place. Once the need for multilevel modeling has been 
established, the researcher then proceeds to build a series of conditional models (i.e. models with 
predictors) in order to explain the variability in the DV. Typically, the models are built bottoms-
up by constructing the level-1 model first to explain within-group (i.e. within-project) variability 
and then explaining between-group variability using level-2 predictors (Snijders and Bosker, 
2012; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  
While entering the variables in the model, it is recommended that they should be 
centered. We also centered all our variables, except the dummies, before the analysis. Centering 
the variable allows for ease of interpretation, reduces multicollinearity concerns and enhances 
the quality of the results (Setia et. al. 2010). All the developer level variables were group-mean 
centered while the project level variables were grand-mean centered (Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002). Next, in order to test for any multicollinearity among predictor variables, we checked for 
correlations among variables and the corresponding VIF values. As can be seen in Tables 9 and 
10, none of the correlation values were abnormally high. In addition, none of the VIF values 
were greater than 5. This suggested that multicollinearity was unlikely to be an issue. In the next 
section, we present the HLM models that were run and the accompanying results. We utilized 
full-maximum likelihood procedure to test our models in the HLM7.0 software (Bryk et. al. 
1996). 
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Table 9. Correlations among Level-1 Predictors and VIF values 
 Part Owner 
Dummy 
Committer 
Dummy 
Contributor 
Dummy 
Number of 
Projects 
VIF 
Part Owner 
Dummy 
1 -.75 -.19 .16 4.34 
Committer 
Dummy 
-.75 1 -.31 -.13 4.65 
Contributor 
Dummy 
-.19 -.31 1 -.10 2.09 
Number of 
Projects 
.16 -.13 -.10 1 1.02 
Note: All correlations are significant at .01 level (2-tailed). None of the VIF values are above 10.   
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Table 10. Correlations among Level-2 Predictors and VIF values 
 Project 
Age 
Number of 
Developers 
Permissive 
License 
Dummy 
Other 
License 
Dummy 
Proportio
n of 
Issues 
Resolved 
Log 
(Downloa
ds By 
Age) 
VIF 
Project Age 1 .21** .03 -.13** .21** .19** 1.14 
Number of 
Developers 
.21** 1 .02 .08 .19** -.06 1.10 
Permissive License 
Dummy 
.03 .02 1 -.19** .04 .11* 1.06 
Other License 
Dummy 
-.13** .08 -.19** 1 -.03 -.11* 1.08 
Proportion of 
Issues Resolved 
.21** .19** .04 -.03 1 .14** 1.09 
Log (Downloads 
By Age)  
.19** -.06 -.11* -.11* .14** 1 1.09 
Note: All correlations are significant at .01 level (2-tailed). None of the VIF values are above 10.   
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3.6 MODELS AND RESULTS 
3.6.1 Unconditional (Null) Models 
As mentioned earlier, an unconditional model does not allow any predictor variables and is only 
used to estimate the level of variance that resides within and between projects. We ran three 
different Null models for the three DVs, namely PDEAD90, PDEAD180 and PDEAD270. This 
allowed us to select the best DV for further analysis with conditional models. Figure 2 shows the 
3 unconditional models.  
Dependent Variable PDEAD90 PDEAD180 PDEAD270 
Null Model PDead90ij = β0j + rij 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
PDead180ij = β0j + rij 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
PDead270ij = β0j + rij 
β0j = γ00 + u0j 
Figure 2. Unconditional (Null) Models 
Where, PDead90ij represents the outcome probability for i
th
 developer in the j
th
 project, 
β0j is the mean outcome for the j
th
 project, rij is the unique effect of the i
th
 developer (error) with a 
variance σ2, γ00 is the grand mean of turnover in the population and u0j is the random effect of j
th
 
project with variance τ00.  Table 11 presents the results of the 3 null models.  
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Table 11. Unconditional (Null) Models with DV observed over 90, 180 and 270 day periods. 
Fixed Effects PDEAD90 PDEAD180 PDEAD270 
Intercept, γ00 .774*** .822** .857*** 
Random Effects    
Level-2 variance, τ00
 
= var(uoj)  
Level-1 variance, σ2 = var(rij) 
.00422*** 
.05163 
.00860*** 
.06614 
.00727*** 
.05776 
 
As can be seen in Table 11, the population mean of probability that a given developer is 
dead (PDEAD) increases from 77.4% to 85.7% with an increase in the observation length. Thus, 
projects tend to lose developers with time, a rather expected result. Note that our study was 
limited to tracking developers that were already associated with the projects and ignores new 
developers that may have joined the projects during the observation period. Thus it seems 
essential for projects to keep on attracting new members in order to survive. The level-2 
variances, τ00, in all 3 models are highly significant suggesting the need for further exploration 
with conditional models. In order to select the best observation period (best outcome variable) 
we noted the following in table 11:  
 The total variance in the outcomes available for explanation (τ00 + σ
2
) increases 
from .05585 for the 90 day period to .07474 for the 180 day period, an increase of 33.82%. 
Surprisingly, the total variance for the 270 day period (.06503) is less than the 180 day period, a 
decrease of 12.99%.  
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 The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)18 values for the 3 models suggest 
that the proportion of explainable level-2 (i.e. between project) variance increases from 7.55% 
(90 day) to 11.50% (180 days) but drops slightly to 11.18% (270 day period).   
These observations suggest that the 180 day period might be more suitable than 90 and 
270 day periods on the basis of amount of variation available for explanation. In addition, we 
found that there were 87 additional developers that contributed in the 180 day period that did not 
contribute at all in the 90 day period. These 87 developers represent a sizable addition to the 517 
developers who had made at least one commit during the 90 day period. The similar number for 
the 270 day period was 41, i.e. less than half. The 180 day observation period has also been used 
in previous research, although using the heuristic measures of turnover (Joyce and Kraut, 2006). 
Finally, the 180 day period, being half-way between the short-term and long-term periods, offers 
a reasonable compromise and is also practically feasible for researchers wishing to study 
turnover in non-contractual settings. The above arguments suggested to us that measuring the 
outcome over the 180 day period (i.e. PDEAD180) was preferable over others, given our data. 
Thus, we retained PDEAD180 as the outcome variable to be further analyzed using the 
conditional models.     
3.6.2 Conditional Models 
The conditional model allows predictors at both levels so that parts of sources of variability in 
the outcome may be accounted by the measured variables. However, the conditional models for 
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 The ICC is the proportion of level-2 variance to the total variance (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).  
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HLM allow for an extraordinarily rich class of modeling possibilities (Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002). As mentioned earlier, a typical approach is to model within-project variability first using 
level-1 predictors, and then modeling the between-project variability using level-2 predictors. In 
order to test for the main effects of level-1 predictors (i.e. H1 and H2) we tested a main effect 
only one-way ANCOVA with random effects model (Model 2). Figure 3 presents Model 2.  
Level-1 Model:  
PDEAD180ij = β0j + β1j (Part Owner Dummy) + β2j (Committer Dummy) + β3j (Contributor 
Dummy) + β4j (Number of Projects) + β5j (Number of Projects)
 2
 + rij 
Level-2 Model:                                         β0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
Figure 3. MODEL 2: One way ANCOVA with Random Effects (main effects) 
Where, γ00 is the mean probability of turnover for a typical sole owner (reference group) 
associated with 3.26 projects across all projects
19
; γ10, γ20 and γ30 represent the differences in 
probabilities of turnover among a typical part owner, committer and contributor as compared to a 
typical sole owner (reference group) respectively. Finally, γ50 and γ60 represent the main effects of 
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 Note that the variable Number of Projects was centered with a mean of 3.26.  
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Number of Projects and (Number of Projects)
 2
, i.e. linear and curvilinear effects, on probability 
of turnover. The third column of Table 12 presents the results of model 2
20
.  
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 For ease of reference, Table 12 also presents the results of the null model (Model 1).  
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Table 12. Results of HLM estimation 
Fixed Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept, γ00 .774*** .651*** .628*** .616** .620*** 
For H1: Ownership (reference group: “Sole 
Owner”), 
Part Owner, γ10 
Committer, γ20 
Contributor, γ30 
  
 
.114*** 
.231*** 
.275*** 
 
 
.144*** 
.252*** 
.299*** 
 
 
.142*** 
.261*** 
.312*** 
 
 
.137*** 
.253*** 
.297*** 
For H2: Developer’s Project Associations, 
Number of Projects, γ40 
(Number of Projects)
2, γ50 
  
-.002 
.00002* 
 
.004 
.00004** 
 
.005 
.00004** 
 
.004 
.00003* 
For H3: Ownership × Number of Projects, 
Part Owner × Number of Projects, γ60 
Committer × Number of Projects, γ70 
Contributor × Number of Projects, γ80 
   
-.010*** 
-.006* 
-.008 
 
-.010** 
-.007* 
-.011 
 
-.009* 
-.006 
-.008 
For Project Level Control Variables, 
Project Age, γ01 
Permissive License, γ02 
Other License, γ03 
Number of Developers, γ04 
    
.003 
.023 
-.007 
-.001 
 
.003 
.023 
-.008 
-.001 
For H4: Project Success Variables, 
Proportion of Issues Resolved, γ05 
Log (Downloads By Age), γ06 
    
-.061*** 
-.011** 
 
-.040 
-.032** 
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For H5: Ownership × Project Success, 
Part Owner  × Proportion of Issues Resolved, γ11 
Part Owner  × Log (Downloads By Age), γ12 
Committer  × Proportion of Issues Resolved, γ21 
Committer  × Log (Downloads By Age), γ22 
Contributor  × Proportion of Issues Resolved, γ31 
Contributor  × Log (Downloads By Age), γ32 
     
-.066 
.024 
.022 
.018 
.050 
.035* 
Random Effects      
Level-2 variance, τ0
2 
= var(uoj) 
 
Level-1 variance, σ2 = var(rij) 
.00860*** 
.06614 
.00998*** 
.06047 
.00978*** 
.06041 
.00884*** 
.06040 
.00919*** 
.06002 
Model Fit      
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 
Deviation Difference (Δχ2) 
Estimated Parameters 
Level-1 R
2
 
599.467 
 
3 
379.029 
220.438*** 
8 
5.73% 
372.246 
6.783* 
11 
6.08% 
352.835 
19.411*** 
17 
7.35% 
342.342 
10.493 
23 
7.39% 
 
Notes: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Deviation differences are calculated as the absolute differences in 
deviance values between the current and the previous model, e.g., ΔD3=|D3-D2| etc. Significance of this 
difference is tested after accounting for the estimated parameters in the models.  
 
In HLM, the Deviance difference test allows comparison of two nested models on same 
data set. The difference in deviances of two models can be used as a chi-squared distributed test 
statistic with a degree of freedom that equals the difference in number of estimated parameters 
(Snijders and Bosker, 2012). The deviance test comparison between Model 1 and 2 suggested 
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that model 2 was a significantly better fit to the data than model 1, ΔD = 220.438, χ2 df = 5, p < 
.01.   
The coefficients γ10, γ20 and γ30 were all significant at the .01 level. The value γ10 = .114 
suggests that a typical part owner was 11.4% more likely to turnover than a typical sole owner. 
In addition, a typical committer and contributor were 23.1% and 27.5% more likely to turnover 
than sole owner in the 180 day period. These findings support H1, which suggested that higher 
levels of ownership in the project are associated with lower levels of turnover.   
The linear effect of Number of Projects, γ40, was not significant. However, the curvilinear 
effect, γ50, was significant. The positive value of γ50 suggested a convex or U-shaped effect 
supporting H2. Next, in order to test the interaction hypothesis between ownership and number 
of projects a developer is associated with (H3), we analyzed model 3 as an extension of model 2 
but with the interaction terms. Figure 4 presents model 3.  
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Level-1 Model: 
PDEAD180ij = β0j + β1j (Part Owner Dummy) + β2j (Committer Dummy) + β3j (Contributor 
Dummy) + β4j (Number of Projects) + β5j (Number of Projects)
 2
 + β6j (Part Owner Dummy 
× Number of Projects) + β7j (Committer Dummy × Number of Projects) + β8j (Contributor × 
Number of Projects) + rij 
Level-2 Model:                                         β0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
β6j = γ60 
β7j = γ70 
β8j = γ80 
      Figure 4. MODEL 3: One way ANCOVA with Random Effects (interaction effects) 
  Where, γ60, γ70 and γ80 represent differences in slopes of part owners, committers and 
contributors with the slope for sole owners (γ40) for the relationship between turnover and 
Number of Projects, respectively.   
After including the 3 interaction terms (model 3) the model fit was significantly 
improved in comparison to model 2 as suggested by the deviance difference test
21
, ΔD = 6.783, 
χ2 df = 3, p < .10. The coefficients γ60 and γ70 were significant suggesting that the differences in 
                                                 
21
 Adding interaction terms of ownership with (Number of Projects)
 2 
did not lead to an 
improved model and thus were not included.    
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slopes among part owners and committers with sole owners were significant. However, this 
difference was not significant for contributors. That is, there were significant differences in the 
prediction of turnover probability by Number of Projects between part owners and sole owners, 
and between committers and sole owners. The negative sign on part owner slope (γ60 + γ40 = - 
0.60) and committer slope (γ60 + γ40 = - 0.20) suggested that part owners and committers were 
less likely to turnover than sole owners with an increase in Number of Projects, thereby 
supporting H3. The random effects for model 3 showed that, even though reduced in comparison 
to model 2, there was still significant residual variance remaining at level-2 (τ0 = 00978, p < .01). 
This suggested modeling this variance with level-2 predictors. 
In order to test for the effect of project success on turnover probability (H4) we included 
the variables Proportion of Issues Resolved and Log (Downloads By Age) as level-2 predictors, 
while controlling for developer characteristics. The project level variables that were controlled 
for were Project Age, Permissive License, Other License and Number of Developers. This 
intercepts-as-outcome (model 4) is presented in Figure 5, while the results are presented in the 
5
th
 column of Table 12.   
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Level-1 Model: 
PDEAD180ij = β0j + β1j (Part Owner Dummy) + β2j (Committer Dummy) + β3j (Contributor 
Dummy) + β4j (Number of Projects) + β5j (Number of Projects)
 2
 + β6j (Part Owner Dummy × 
Number of Projects) + β7j (Committer Dummy × Number of Projects) + β8j (Contributor × 
Number of Projects) + rij 
Level-2 Model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Project Age) + γ02 (Permissive License Dummy) + γ03 (Other License Dummy) 
+ γ04 (Number of Developers) + γ05 (Proportion of Issues Resolved) + γ06 (Log (Downloads by 
Age)) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
β6j = γ60 
β7j = γ70 
β8j = γ80 
               Figure 5. MODEL 4: Intercepts-as-outcome 
Where, γ05 and γ06 represent the effects of Proportion of Issues Resolved and Log 
(Downloads By Age) on the mean probability of turnover, i.e. the main effect of project success; 
and γ01, γ02, γ03 and γ04 represent the effect of control variables.  
The deviance difference test in Table 12 showed that model 4 was a significant 
improvement over model 3, ΔD = 19.411, χ2 df = 6, p < .01. We also observed significant negative 
effects of Proportion of Issues Resolved (γ05 = -.061, p < .01) and Log (Downloads By Age) (γ05 = 
 lxxiv 
 
-.011, p < .01) on probability of turnover thereby supporting H4. Interestingly, none of the 
control variables had a significant effect on the outcome. The variance component of level-2 
random effect was reduced compared to model 3, however it was still significant (τ0 = 00884, p < 
.01).  
Next, in order to test if there were cross-level interactions (i.e. interactions among level-1 
and level-2 predictors) as hypothesized in H5, we tested a slopes-as-outcome (model 5) as 
presented in Figure 5. The results are presented in the 6
th
 column of Table 12.  
The deviance difference test showed that model 5 was not better than model 4, ΔD = 
10.493, χ2 df = 6, p >.10, and hence was rejected in favor of the more parsimonious and better 
fitting model 4 (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Thus, we did not find any support for H5.  
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Level-1 Model: 
PDEAD180ij = β0j + β1j (Part Owner Dummy) + β2j (Committer Dummy) + β3j (Contributor 
Dummy) + β4j (Number of Projects) + β5j (Number of Projects)
 2
 + β6j (Part Owner Dummy × 
Number of Projects) + β7j (Committer Dummy × Number of Projects) + β8j (Contributor × 
Number of Projects) + rij 
Level-2 Model: 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Project Age) + γ02 (Permissive License Dummy) + γ03 (Other License Dummy) 
+ γ04 (Number of Developers) + γ05 (Proportion of Issues Resolved) + γ06 (Log (Downloads by 
Age)) + u0j 
β1j = γ10 + γ11 (Proportion of Issues Resolved) + γ12 (Log (Downloads by Age)) 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (Proportion of Issues Resolved) + γ22 (Log (Downloads by Age)) 
β3j = γ30 + γ31 (Proportion of Issues Resolved) + γ32 (Log (Downloads by Age)) 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
β6j = γ60 
β7j = γ70 
β8j = γ80 
Figure 6. MODEL 5: Intercepts-as-outcome 
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3.7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
This study is limited in several ways. First, we only chose to observe developer contributions as 
code commits. However, past research has shown the importance of other kinds of contributions, 
often by peripheral developers, such as code documentation, managing websites, wikis and 
mailing lists, popularizing projects through positive word-of-mouth etc. (Setia et. al 2010). 
However, since code commits are a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the success of an 
open source project, understanding factors that may impact the actual code development are 
necessary.  
Second, we only chose to observe projects that used SVN as their code management 
system and neglected projects that used other increasingly popular systems such as GIT and 
Mercurial. While it is our conjecture that our results should be generalizable to projects using 
other SCM systems, it remains a work for the future.  
Third, our choice of project success measures is in no manner exhaustive. Past OSS 
literature has differentiated between the market success, technical success and team effectiveness 
of the project and why such a distinction is warranted (e.g. Grewal et. al. 2006, Stewart and 
Gosain 2006, Crowston et. al. 2004, Sagers 2004, Crowston and Scozzi 2002). It would be 
interesting to further explore what kind of project success matters more for which relationship. In 
addition, Shah (2006) argued that OSS developers are motivated for a variety of reasons and 
explored the differences between core and peripheral developers. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to see what kinds of project success or failure impacts the retention rates of which 
group.   
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. Fourth, we had excluded projects that did not show any activity in the 30 day period 
before data collection, an arbitrary cut-off. However, on revisiting some projects that were 
excluded it was found that the projects were still in-development. In fact there were some 
projects that were “resurrected” after long periods of inactivity. This has the potential to bias our 
results in favor of recently active projects.  
Fifth, we assumed that any developer whose name was listed on the project was still 
associated with it. While this is true in a formal sense, some developers may have “left” the 
project even though their names still appeared on the project list. There were many developers in 
our data set that never made any code commits in any observation period. In such a case, their 
Pareto/NBD PDEAD values kept decreasing with increasing observation periods. On the other 
hand, there were some developers that “resurrected” themselves and became more active as 
observation period increased. This suggests that future researchers might be able to uncover 
interesting findings using longitudinal or time-series analyses.  
Finally, we only analyzed projects that were not sponsored by an external agency. 
Increasingly, many for-profit companies are sponsoring open source projects and paying 
developers to work on them (West and O’Mahony, 2008). Our results cannot be generalized to 
such settings and more work is required to distinguish any differences in the phenomena 
analyzed in this study among sponsored projects.                  
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4.0 OVERALL CONTRIBUTIONS  
There are likely to be several contributions of this work. Table 13 presents a summary of the 
hypotheses and results of the empirical analyses. First, we merged the Ownership and Social 
Identity literatures to argue that the effect of ownership on member retention is moderated by the 
threat to the identity, i.e. project success. We showed that managing ownership structures are 
critical for projects to maintain an active developer base. Overall, sole owners were least likely 
to turnover followed by part owners, committers and contributors. However, as the number of 
project associations increased, lower ownership levels were associated with greater chances of 
retention. This presents a trade-off for project managers in terms of managing the ownership 
structures in the project. The implications are likely to be generalizable to other online 
community forms of production such as Wikis.  
Second, we argued that the correct way to model OSS developer participation level is to 
acknowledge the inherently nested nature of the data. Analyzing effects at multiple (i.e. at 
individual and group) levels and how they may interact allows for a deeper understanding of how 
developers are likely to continue working on projects. For example, is there a difference in 
turnover rates among sole-owners in a small project (with few other developers) and sole-owners 
in a large project? In the former case, the sole owner may feel lower levels of accountability 
while in the latter case he/she may feel more accountable and responsible for the well-being of 
the project. This opens up interesting avenues as to how the size and the presence and number of 
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other owners affect the performance of a developer. Since OSS developers work under multiple 
contexts, it is very likely that the extra-project context also matters. This will allow OSS 
researchers to begin exploring how developers regulate their commitment levels across multiple 
projects.  
Table 13. Summary for Hypothesized Relationships 
Hypothesis 1: An OSS participant’s level of ownership in the project will 
be negatively associated with turnover. Specifically, we hypothesized 
that sole owners will be least likely to turnover from a project followed 
by part owners, committers and contributors respectively.  
Supported 
Hypothesis 2: Overall, the number of projects a developer is associated 
with has a U-shaped relationship with turnover in a given project. 
Specifically, the probability of developer turnover will decrease up to a 
point as the number of projects the developer is associated with on 
increases, after which it will increase.  
Supported 
Hypothesis 3: The number of currently active projects a developer is 
associated with, will moderate the relationship between the level of 
ownership of the developer and turnover in that project. Specifically, as 
the number of associations increase, developers with higher levels of 
ownership in the focal project will be more likely to leave than 
developers with lower levels of ownership.  
Supported 
Hypothesis 4: Overall, the success of the OSS project is negatively 
related to turnover in that project. Specifically, as the project success 
increases the chances of a developer working in it leaving are reduced. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5: The success of the OSS project will moderate the 
relationship between the level of ownership of developer and turnover in 
that project. Specifically, as the project success decreases, developers 
with higher level of ownership will be less likely to leave than 
developers with lower levels of ownership. 
Not Supported 
 
Third, we introduced a practical way of operationalizing turnover and are the first to 
show the application of the Pareto-NBD model in an online community context. We argued that 
this approach is preferable over the heuristic measures that have been used in the past, and can 
become an important tool for future researchers. In order to assess the adequate length of 
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observation period, we compared 3 potential outcomes spread over short, medium and long term, 
and concluded that a medium term observation period appears suitable in the OSS context. In 
fact, the Pareto-NBD model may be strained if very long histories of developer activities are 
taken into account (Schmittlein et al. 1987). If the complete past of a developer that has worked 
for years is taken into account, the death rate μ will be close to zero, thus allowing the developer 
to stay alive for a very long time in the future. In the Marketing context, Schmittlein et al. (1987) 
recommended an observation period not greater than 2 years even in presence of more data. 
Since other online voluntary contexts such as Wikis may inherently different rates of 
development and life cycles, it opens the door for researchers to assess appropriate periods in 
these fresh contexts.      
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